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THE HIGH STAKES OF WTO REFORM 
James Thuo Gathii* 
BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF TRADE NEGOTIA­
TIONS!fHE LESSONS OF CANCUN. By Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa. 
London: Zed Books. Updated Edition, 2004. Pp. vi, 329. Cloth, $58.95; 
paper, $19.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
Behind the Scenes at the WTO definitively exposes how the trade­
negotiation process makes it possible for a few rich countries to dominate 
the trade agenda at the expense of all other countries. It is one of the first 
studies that authoritatively shows how trade negotiations have developed 
into "a game for high stakes, between unequally matched teams, where 
much of the game is played with few rules and no referee" (p. 50). The book 
attributes the deadlocked nature of the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations and the recent disruptions of the World Trade Organization's 
("WTO") ministerial meetings to the secretive and noninclusive nature of 
negotiations and decisionmaking at the WT0.1 Authors Jawara2 and Kwa3 
base their conclusions on semistructured interviews with a broad cross­
section of trade officials from all over the world who represent their gov­
ernments in thirty-three missions at the WTO, on interviews with staffers of 
the WTO Secretariat, and on their own research.4 
Through numerous examples, the authors show why developing coun­
tries in the past have been unable to prevail over the big trading countries at 
the WTO (pp. 150-83). The authors conclude that to be effective, low­
income developing countries must either unite as a bloc (p. 182) or hang on 
to the hope that they will prevail by virtue of the strength or merits of their 
arguments (p. 150). By captivating their readers with the intrigues behind 
the scenes at the WTO, the authors introduce a welcome realism about how 
* Associate Professor, Albany Law School. LL.B. 1992, University of Nairobi; LL.M. 
1995, S.J.D. 1999, Harvard. 
1. While the 2003 edition of the book focuses primarily on the 2001 Doha Ministerial and 
the lead-up to it, the 2004 updated edition also includes an extensive introduction focusing on the 
2003 Cancun Ministerial and its aftermath. 
2. Freelance International Trade and Development Analyst. 
3 .  Trade Analyst, Focus on the Global South (a policy research and activist organization). 
4. Pp. 1- 2. To their credit, the authors note that the sources of the information on which the 
book is based "are well-informed, reliable sources inside the WTO system; most observed the events 
they described at first hand; and their accounts have been independently corroborated wherever 
possible. " Pp. 148-4 9. 
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trade negotiations actually work5 and how developing countries "find them­
selves locked in a vicious cycle of political impotence, unfair trading rules 
and weakening trade performance" (p. 182). 
It is a book that the theoreticians of the WTO cannot afford to ignore be­
cause while it confirms much of the theoretical literature, it also adds 
significant insights. First, I will examine this literature before showing how 
Jawara and K wa go beyond it. This literature, based on anecdotal evidence 
but primarily driven by theory, has sought to explain the disruptions and 
deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations, particularly since the collapses 
of the Seattle Ministerial meeting in 1999 and the Cancun Ministerial in 
2003. The basic premise in this literature has been that the WTO faces a 
democratic deficit arising from lack of transparency in the negotiating proc­
ess and lack of diverse participation of stakeholders within the WT0.6 
Previous scholarship on multilateral trade negotiations has similarly noted 
the "pyramidal bargaining" model of great power dominance; others have 
referred to it as "vertical multilateralism."7 During the cold war, the United 
States supported multilateralism and international economic institutions as a 
strategy to persuade industrial nations to join a U.S.-led alliance in support 
of free markets and against the Soviet Union.8 From this vantage point, mul­
tilateralism was not a commitment to cooperating on issues of third world 
development, but rather to establishing a U.S.-led commitment in favor of 
free markets and U.S. geopolitical interests. 
5. Gregory C. Shaffer's article, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democ­
racy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REv. I, 4 (2001), also advocates the adoption of a sociolegal approach that focuses on a 
micro, rather than a macro, understanding of those elements that actually shape legal outcomes in 
connection with the trade regime. See also GREGORY c. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PuBLIC­
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION, at ix-xi (2003 ). 
6. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye point out that this lack of participation and transparency 
amounts to a democratic deficit. Democratic deficit thus reflects what they argue is a "lack of effec­
tive politicians who link organizations to constituencies. " Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. , 
The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFF1-
CIENCY, EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 
264 , 265 (R. Porter et al. eds., 2001). 
7. GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION 
3 54 (1986) (arguing that pyramidal bargaining during the Tokyo Round "whereby negotiations were 
initiated by the major nations . .. only after important decisions had been made and compromises 
had been struck . .. .  caused resentment, particularly among the developing countries which were 
most frequently excluded from the process "); Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large 
Numbers, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS 295, 3 02--0 5 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1 993 )  (describing 
pyramidal bargaining in the early years of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT")); 
see also WINHAM, supra, at 64- 65, 174-75, 177-78. Kahler notes that "hegemonic power has often 
been portrayed as the only solution to multilateral collective action dilemmas after 1945 . . . .  " 
Kahler, supra, at 299. Kahler is skeptical of this view; for his proposed solutions for negotiating in 
big numbers, see id. at 316-21. 
8. MELVYN P. LEFFLER, A PREPONDERANCE OF POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE TRUMAN 
ADMINISTRATION, AND THE COLD WAR 17 (1992); see also Gautam Sen, The United States and the 
GATTIWTO System, in us HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 115, 1 17 (Rosemary 
Foot et al. eds., 2003 ) ("US paramountcy and the challenge to it from communism defined the politics 
of the post-Second World War world. The political, economic, and military primacy of the US was the 
most significant influence on the negotiations over the post-war inlemational economic order. "). 
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In the late 1980s, when the United States enhanced its controversial 
§ 301 unilateral powers to punish violators of its trade rights without re­
course to the multilateral GATT framework, some scholars argued that this 
version of "muscular" or great-power leadership is permissible as long as it 
increases trade liberalization, even if such unilateralism is inconsistent with 
the letter and spirit of the WTO's compulsory dispute settlement system.9 
Thus multilateralism within the GATT was for the most part limited to what 
the United States regarded as its core values. In the absence of agreement 
among its allies, the United States often abandoned these values for outright 
U.S. leadership. Medium- and low-income countries that dissented from 
these values or rejected U.S. leadership often felt the brunt of U.S. will.10 
Behind the Scenes at the WTO insightfully exposes how pyramidal bar­
gammg works within a highly secretive organization in which 
decisionmaking processes are still dominated by its richest members: the 
United States, the European Union, Canada, and Japan (referred to as the 
Quad), just as in the old GATT (pp. 56-59, 149). Thus, decisions on impor­
tant issues are made without broad-based consultation with the entire WTO 
membership'' and the domestic constituencies of member countries. The 
decisionmaking process at the WTO is further hobbled by the fact that most 
of the least-developed countries are not even represented in Geneva, where 
these decisions are made (pp. 22, 274, 293). Even developing countries that 
have representation in Geneva are stretched too thinly to attend the more 
than one thousand formal and informal meetings, symposia, workshops, and 
seminars held under the auspices of WTO bodies to negotiate or discuss new 
or existing trade rules or disputes about the application and interpretation of 
these rules (p. 22). In this and many other ways, Behind the Scenes at the 
WTO exposes some of the theoretical literature's mythical depiction of the 
WTO as a faceless, bureaucratic, and technocratic institution. Behind the 
Scenes at the WTO also sheds new light by exposing the manner and extent 
to which the views of many in its membership are underrepresented, if not 
entirely absent from the table. 
9. Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRES· 
SIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 3 01 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 113 (Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1 9 90 ). A WTO panel later declined to find the powers in§ 3 01 to be 
inconsistent with the WTO's compulsory dispute settlement system under which only the dispute set­
tlement body can find violations of a member's WTO obligations. See Panel Report, United States­
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 'l! 7.22, WT/DS152/ R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
10. See GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2004); James Thuo Gathii, Humanizing the Pax-Americana Global 
Empire, 4 WASH. u. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 121 (2005) (book review). 
11. The exclusion of developing countries from behind-the-scenes negotiations and the disquiet 
among them dates as far back as the Kennedy and Tokyo GATT rounds. See WINHAM, supra note 7, at 
354 (noting that pyramidal bargaining caused resentment among developing countries). Winham also 
notes: 
The major political difficulty in concluding the Tokyo Round was the opposition of the develop­
ing countries. This opposition was a product of several specific disputes and of a more generalized 
belief that the overall benefits of the accords were not sufficiently in the interests of developing 
countries to warrant their acceptance. 
Id. at 3 03 .  
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Ultimately, Behind the Scenes goes one step beyond the current theoreti­
cal literature on the nature of reforms needed at the WTO. The major 
premise in this literature has been that organizational and procedural re­
forms at the WTO will resolve its legitimacy crisis. Jawara and Kwa 
recognize that while transparency and organizational reforms are important 
for the legitimacy of the WTO, reform must also focus on the manner in 
which the WTO agenda is currently biased in favor of the interests of its 
most-developed members at the expense of less affluent members. 
Behind the Scenes shows the tactics deployed by developed countries to 
inhibit developing countries from negotiating for more favorable rules or to 
incapacitate them from changing preexisting rules that are rigged against 
them, such as the rules in the agricultural sector.12 These tactics include "di­
vide and rule" strategies against coalitions opposed to developed-country 
interests, arm-twisting countries and pressuring delegates into submission, 
black-listing ambassadors opposed to the agenda of the Quad countries and 
the United States in particular, and drafting and directing texts while ignor­
ing the views of developing countries (pp. xxxv-xlvi, 148-83, 272-76). 
These tactics help developed countries to push through their agendas over 
the objections of developing countries. By exposing these tactics, the book 
recognizes that power imbalances between powerful and less powerful 
countries in setting the agenda is a factor in the crisis at the WTO. Most 
simply put, it is not that developing countries are suspicious of freer trade, 
as a former Director General of the WTO has argued, 13 but rather that they 
are suspicious of the rigged and distorted nature of the decisionmaking 
process and its outcomes, which--contrary to what the WTO stands for­
often look little or nothing like free-trade rules. 
Like Jawara and Kwa's book, this Review proceeds from the premise 
that the ascendant analysis of WTO reform, which focuses on efforts to in­
crease public involvement and to improve transparency and reduce secrecy, 
may be insufficient to counterbalance the dominant trade interests at the 
WTO that currently favor the richest countries in the world. 14 If undertaken 
in isolation from some of the pressing needs of developing countries, such 
as comprehensive agricultural reform, well-meaning transparency and par­
ticipatory reforms will prove ineffectual to resolve the legitimacy crisis at 
the WTO. Indeed, if the trade agenda continues to expand into areas in 
which developed countries have a comparative advantage while leaving un­
addressed outstanding issues within �existing agreements that are currently 
inimical to the interests of developing countries, such expansions will likely 
erode the gains of any reforms aimed at the effective and full participation 
12. I develop these arguments in James Thuo Gathii, Process and Substance in WTO Refonn, 
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 885 (2004). 
13. MIKE MOORE, A WORLD WITHOUT WALLS: FREEDOM, DEVELOPMENT, FREE TRADE AND 
GLOBAL GovERNANCE 133 (2003). 
14. See Gathii, supra note 12. Jawara and Kwa note that even if all the procedural reforms 
they propose "were implemented in full, while they might help to limit the major developed coun­
tries' abuse of their political and economic power, they would fall far short of preventing it." P. 278. 
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of developing countries and their citizens in the decision- and policymaking 
of theWTO. 
Thus, while increasing public involvement and improving transparency 
are critical to give all WTO members fair representation in decisionmaking, 
there is an equally compelling case for addressing the bias by which the 
industrial and service sectors are more liberalized than agriculture and other 
sectors important to developing countries. It is my basic claim that organiza­
tional and procedural deficiencies at the WTO only partially account for the 
collapse of the ministerial conferences in Seattle and Cancun and the legiti­
macy crisis of the WTO in general. Substantive issues such as the exclusion 
of agricultural and commodity trade from the free-trade mandate of the 
GAIT and WTO and the bias favoring sectors in which developed countries 
have a comparative advantage further exacerbate the legitimacy crisis of the 
global trade regime. I therefore join with Jawara and Kwa when they regard 
as interrelated and inseparable their proposals for reforming the negotiation 
framework by making it more transparent on the one hand, with reforms 
aimed at addressing substantive issues of interest to developing countries­
such as development and access to essential medicines-on the other. As 
Ann Capling has persuasively argued, internal governance reforms are "in­
trinsically linked" to "developing country problems in the WT0."15 
In Part I, I summarize the main themes in Behind the Scenes at the WTO. 
In particular, I focus on Jawara and Kwa's discussion of the breakdown of 
the negotiation process and inattention to questions of development within 
the WTO. In Part II, I discuss how the dispute-settlement system and the 
rigged nature of the rules relating to agricultural trade compound the legiti­
macy crisis in the WTO. In the Conclusion, I reflect on some reform 
proposals. 
I. MAJOR THEMES IN Behind the Scenes at the WTO 
A. Problems with the Negotiating Process 
The authors contend that the 1994 Uruguay Round agreements as well 
as the 200 1 Doha negotiating mandate (p. xv) were imposed on developing 
countries by developed countries (pp. 62-64, 67, 78). The result has been 
that the playing field of the trading regime-its benefits and its negotiating 
framework-has been lopsided, favoring developed countries and harming 
the interests of developing countries (pp. xi, 93, 118-27, 269-71). On the 
very first page of the book, the authors argue that while developing coun­
tries "profoundly disagreed" with the negotiating agenda at the 2001 Doha 
Ministerial conference, developed countries beat them "into submission" 
after a night-long meeting held after the scheduled end of the ministerial and 
after "the departure of some developing-country delegations" (p. xv; see 
15. Ann Capling, The Multilateral Trading System at Risk?: Three Challenges to the World 
Trade Organization, in THE WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE 
37, 50 ( Ross P. Buckley ed., 2003); see also Gathii, supra note 12. 
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also p. 103). In addition, delegates from francophone countries participated 
in the Doha Ministerial meeting without simultaneous interpretation or 
French translations of the documents under discussion (pp. 97-98). The 
book traces the tactics that developed countries and the WTO Secretariat 
have used to ensure that their agenda prevails. The Cancun (pp. lvii-lxxii) 
and Doha (pp. 19fr-215, 222-23, 227-30, 275-77, 304--06) Ministerial 
meetings are the most important case studies examined in the book. The 
Hong Kong Ministerial of December 2005 was held after the publication of 
the 2004 edition of Jawara and Kwa's book and is not therefore examined in 
this Review. 
Jawara and Kwa argue that in return for allowing the Doha Round of 
talks and to avoid the lopsidedness of the Uruguay Round agreements, 
developing countries were promised three concessions: first, that a devel­
opment agenda would be at the heait of the new negotiations; second, that 
explicit consensus would be a prerequisite to negotiating new trade agree­
ments to encompass transparency in government procurement, trade 
facilitation, competition, and investment ("the Singapore issues"); and third, 
that there would be an agreement on a Ministerial Declaration on the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
("TRIPs") and public health, addressing problems of access to essential 
medicines and focusing on permitting compulsory licensing. The authors 
argue that in light of the events surrounding the failure of the Cancun Minis­
terial meeting in September 2003, "all three [promises] were worthless" 
(p. xv). 
The authors celebrate the fact that at the Cancun Ministerial, develop­
ing-country unity-particularly through the coalition of twenty developing 
countries that formed ("the Group of 20"}-prevented developed countries 
from extending the Cancun Ministerial into the wee hours and playing "last­
minute brinkmanship to ram through their agenda" (p. xvi; see also pp. 110--
12, 135) as they did at the Doha Ministerial (pp. 102--05). By announcing 
the end of the Cancun Ministerial conference at 2:30 P.M. on its last sched­
uled day, September 14, 2003, the Mexican Foreign Affairs Minister was 
acquiescing to the "disbelief, acrimony and anger"-especially within the 
Group of 20---that the positions of developing countries had been "entirely 
disregarded" in the September 13 draft of the Ministerial Declaration that 
would otherwise have emerged from Cancun (p. xvi). For example, the draft 
included a negotiating mandate on the Singapore issues although there was 
no explicit consensus on proceeding with any of them. 
Pascal Lamy, the European Communities Trade Commissioner at the 
time of the Cancun Ministerial and now the Director General of the WTO, 
summarized the failure of the meeting in the following terms: "The WTO 
remains a medieval organization . . . .  The procedures and rules of this or­
ganization have not supported the weight of the task. There is no way to 
structure and steer discussions amongst 146 members in a manner condu-
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cive to consensus. The decision-making needs to be revamped."16 Although 
the authors are skeptical of his specific reform proposals insofar as he seeks 
to create a Security-Council-like executive arm within the WTO as proposed 
in the Sutherland Report, 17 they certainly share his assessment that the 
WTO's negotiating process has broken down and-like some developing­
country delegations-they propose a more democratic and transparent proc­
ess through which all views will be taken into account (pp. xxii, 222-27). 
Jawara and K wa then consider how the Cancun Ministerial exemplified 
the breakdown of the negotiating process through a discussion of how the 
Singapore issues, agriculture, cotton, TRIPs and public health, and devel­
opment issues were addressed. A key objection to opening negotiations on 
the Singapore issues-besides lack of explicit consensus-was the fact that 
developing countries had not had an opportunity to examine the proposals 
put forward as annexes to the proposed Cancun Ministerial Declaration (p. 
xxv). The position taken by developed countries regarding the Doha negoti­
ating mandate was that it was sufficiently flexible to permit proposals for 
commencing negotiations or for setting a negotiating agenda on some or all 
of the issues (pp. xxiii-iv). This position was in direct contradiction to the 
understanding of developing countries that "explicit consensus" in the Doha 
negotiating mandate meant that unanimity among all countries was a pre­
requisite for negotiating any new commitments or even for discussing 
negotiation modalities (p. xxv). Jawara and Kwa note that the European Un­
ion's insistence on proceeding with negotiations on all or some of the 
Singapore issues may very well have been the "poison pill"18 that killed 
Cancun by diverting attention away from the more contentious issues of 
agriculture on which the European Union was unwilling to yield (p. xlviii). 
It is not at all clear that the European Union was willing to make any 
meaningful concession in agriculture. Like the United States, the European 
Union's lack of commitment to genuine agricultural trade reform is evidenced 
by its refusal to commit to specific tariff reduction targets, to reduce its huge 
domestic support programs, such as cotton subsidies, and to end export sub­
sidies. Even with huge reductions in bound levels of trade-distorting 
support, the European Union and other huge subsidizers would still have 
little to lose since the bound levels of support are substantially higher than 
actual levels of support.19 These refusals to genuinely reform agricultural 
16. P. xxii (quoting Pascal Lamy, Press Conference Closing the World Trade Organization's 
Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico (Sept. 14, 2003 )) (alteration in original). 
17. See PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., CONSULTATIVE Bo. TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL Su­
PACHAI PANITCHPAKDI, THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN 
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 71 (2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ ! Oanniv_e/ 
future_wto_e.pdf (proposing a consultative body among Trade Ministers in which major trading 
nations "would inevitably be permanent members"). 
1 8 .  See Editorial, The Cancun Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003 ,  at A24. Jawara and Kwa 
note that by contrast, the European Union blamed the United States for scuttling the talks, p. xlix, 
while the United States blamed developing countries and the G20 in particular, pp. Ii-Iii. 
1 9 .  See The July 31st 2004 WTO Agreement on Agriculture: A Critical Review, AGRITRADE 
NEWS UPDATE (Technical Center for Agric. & Rural Cooperation ACP-EU, Wageningen, Neth.), 
Aug. 6, 2004, http://agritrade.cta.int/alert040806-wto.htm. 
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trade were a direct reason for the formation of the Group of 20 at the Can­
cun Ministerial (p. xxvii). With the support of the Group of 20 and most 
developing and least-developed countries, West and Central African coun­
tries affected by cotton subsidies proposed a separate agreement ending all 
cotton subsidies, but opposition by developed countries, particularly the 
United States, killed the initiative that had become the flagship development 
issue at the ministerial (pp. xxvii-xxxi). Unbelievably, the U.S. Trade Rep­
resentative ("USTR") at the time, Robert Zoellick, argued that these 
countries should diversify away from cotton, notwithstanding the fact that 
cotton subsidies are contrary to both the spirit of liberalizing agricultural 
trade-and were recently found to be against various WTO agreements by 
the WTO's Appellate Body ("AB")20-as well as to the development objec­
tives that ought to be central in the Doha Round. To suggest that these 
countries should diversify away from cotton although they are the most effi­
cient producers of cotton demonstrates the United States' intransigent 
refusal to make any meaningful concessions in agriculture. 
On access to essential medicines, Jawara and K wa reveal how secret ne­
gotiations between the United States and its developed-country allies, on 
one side, and four developing countries, on the other, hammered out a com­
promise solution known as the Motta text (pp. xxxii, 249-57). What is 
striking about the Motta text is that it was publicized as a historic agree­
ment, notwithstanding its restrictions on the importation and exportation of 
generic drugs that made it as burdensome as Article 31 of the TRIPs agree­
ment, which it was intended to moderate (p. xxxii). The restrictions it 
imposed on compulsory licensing undermine such a rosy view. The burden­
some requirements of the Motta text, which include a requirement that the 
TRIPs Council have authority to monitor individual compulsory licenses, 
resulted in a "cosmetic," "painful two-year exercise" to make the United 
States "appear sympathetic towards development and deflect international 
criticism, while in reality protecting its own commercial interests" 
(p. xxxiii). Jawara and Kwa uncovered evidence that Kenyan negotiators, 
among others, objected to the Motta text and that Kenyan consent was pro­
cured by a call placed to the Kenyan Trade Minister, who was informed that 
Kenya was the only holdout nation on the deal.21 
In October 2005, the U.S. offered to cut its agricultural subsidies as a signal to other WTO 
members of its commitment to continuing the deadlock in the Doha Round. However, the U.S.'s 
proposal to cut its huge subsidies would have merely reallocated the amounts given to farms as 
subsidies to other types of grants. See Press Release, Oxfam, U.S. Farm Subsidies Offer 
Smoke and Mirrors (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/press/release/trade_ 
ussubsidies l 0 l 005.htm. 
20. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/ 
AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005). 
21. Jawara and Kwa also describe how U.S. negotiators called the president of an African 
country following objections by a negotiator from that country to an issue of particular interest to 
the United States. The U.S. negotiator then told the African negotiator that the president of their 
country was supportive of the U.S. position since the president recognized that supporting the issue 
would translate into continued access to the U.S. market under the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act. Pp. 86- 87. For a discussion of the actions of a Ugandan ambassador who pushed a developing 
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Ultimately, it is not only that the negotiating process at WTO ministerial 
meetings has broken down; there is more. Jawara and Kwa note, for exam­
ple, that "the preparatory process for Cancun was even less transparent than 
those for Seattle and Doha-and, it seemed, deliberately so" (p. xxxv). In 
addition, the book discusses "green room" meetings, which are closed meet­
ings between a select group of countries--often with Quad countries at the 
center-where no minutes are kept, yet important decisions are made and 
imposed on the rest of the membership (pp. 17-18, 75, 133-35). 
There are other pressures brought to bear in the negotiating process that 
those responsible have no reason to continue except to undermine the multi­
lateral nature of negotiating under the WTO umbrella. For example, 
powerful WTO members like the United States and the European Union 
have used their development assistance programs and preferential trading 
programs as a carrot and stick to prevail upon developing countries with 
objections to their agendas (pp. 152-59). These powerful countries also 
sometimes threaten the careers of developing-:country diplomats at Geneva 
who object to their agendas by contacting their superiors in order to pressure 
them into acquiescing (pp. 150-52). Such actions create an atmosphere of 
intimidation and facilitate the ability of powerful countries to push through 
objectionable policies. 
Tactics that question the integrity and threaten the careers of otherwise 
committed diplomats were also used by powerful countries against small 
countries in the run-up to the vote on United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1441, relating to Iraq.22 The United States has used a variety of 
other pressures and incentives, including signing bilateral trade deals with 
compliant countries to undermine the ability of developing countries to take 
a common position on matters of mutual interest in WTO negotiations (pp. 
163-64), promises of technical assistance to buy off countries with views 
different from the United States (pp. 169-70, 176-77), and rewards of fi­
nancial assistance for cooperation with the United States in nontrade areas 
such as debt relief and security arrangements for the U.S. war on terrorism 
(pp. 174-75, 272). These pressures buy support from countries otherwise 
hesitant to back the United States' WTO agenda (pp. 164-66, 173). 
The WTO's negotiating process is simply in a total mess. Developed 
countries have opposed the adoption of clear negotiating rules governing 
how all WTO members arrive at decisions in a transparent, inclusive and 
participatory manner. Ministerial meetings are held over the space of a few 
days with the result that the negotiations are conducted in a pressure-cooker 
atmosphere. In addition, developed country members use a panoply of nego­
tiating strategies including threats towards poorer countries. These and other 
problems with the negotiating and decisionmaking process at the WTO has 
country agenda in Geneva and was not sensitive to the U.S. agenda, and the resultant calls to Presi­
dent Museveni to ensure that the ambassador toed the U.S. line, see pages 179-80. 
22. See Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27, 53-58 (2003). 
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unsurprisingly contributed to the two failed ministerial meetings as well as 
the start-stop nature of the Doha Round. 
B. Inattentiveness to Issues of Development 
The GAIT was originally signed by thirty-three countries.23 For these 
largely industrial economies, the goal of the GAIT was to liberalize trade in 
industrial products while ensuring that liberalization did not adversely im­
pact their commitment to a welfare state at home.24 In the 1960s and 1970s, 
a number of developing countries just freed from colonial rule joined the 
GATT. These countries "sought to use the organization to gain preferential 
trading arrangements consistent with their development needs. Such de­
mands conflicted with the trading interests of the industrialized nations that 
had originated the GAIT, and thus a fundamental change was established 
that continues to be central to the politics of the organization."25 The central 
tension in the mission of the WTO is between its trade liberalization man­
date-which is supported by its most powerful members--on the one hand, 
and ensuring that trade contributes to the development goals of developing 
countries, such as raising standards of living, on the other. Efforts to mediate 
the tension between trade liberalization and development are incorporated in 
the preamble to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement, which acknowledges that 
the optimal use of the world's resources must be in accordance with the 
principle of sustainable development and must be with a view to raising 
standards of living.26 Despite these efforts, little has changed in the tension 
between liberalization and development within the WTO. 
Behind the Scenes points to long-standing issues that continue to frus­
trate developing nations, such as lack of access to largely closed Western 
markets for developing countries' products and produce (pp. 55-56); faded 
emphasis on the principle of special and differential treatment (pp. 46-47, 
264-65); reduced commitment to making development and reform agricul­
ture central components of the Doha agenda (pp. xxxv, 257-59); extension 
of the trading regime into protecting intellectual property rights as well as 
liberalizing trade in services, 27 resulting in a reduction in the kind of policy 
23. Elaine S. Povich, New Era in World Trade Begins as Senate Approves GAIT Treaty, CHI. 
Turn., Dec. 2, 1994, at NI. 
24. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG., 379, 392-96 (1982). 
25. WINHAM, supra note 7, at 21. 
26. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, in THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 5, 
6 (1994). The view that sustainable development was a central part of the WTO's mandate was 
affirmed by the Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of 
Cf!rtain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 'I[ 152, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). For an excellent 
discussion of making trade sensitive to development issues, see U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME ET AL., 
MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE (2003). 
27. Other outstanding issues include the obligations on technical barriers to trade and sani­
tary and phytosanitary measures in the complex agreements imposed on these countries in the 
Uruguay Round. 
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space that was an essential component of the institutional innovations asso­
ciated with the economic success of East Asian economies;28 and how the 
implementation of the WTO's trade mandates in developing countries un­
dermine critical development goals, including the food security and general 
livelihood of ordinary people (pp. xiii, 4-5). 
What is really new in the traditional split between developed countries' 
support for free-trade rules and policies on the one hand and developing 
countries' support for trade development issues on the other is the unprece­
dented unity of developing countries, particularly in Cancun. The Group of 
20 served as an effective bulwark against the pyramidal bargaining strategy 
of the United States and the European Union. The Cancun Ministerial was 
scuttled by the inability of the European Union and the United States to 
overcome the concerns of the Group of 20, particularly to the extent that the 
views of developing countries and the issues of concern to them, such as 
development, had been excluded in the draft Ministerial Declaration 
(p. xvi). 
Behind the Scenes therefore tells a story that is not only about the inat­
tentiveness to questions of development that are of concern to developing 
countries, but that also challenges theoretical work that has argued that de­
veloping countries are incapable of banding together in trade negotiations 
because "nations formulate their negotiating positions primarily on the basis 
of economic interests, and these are usually not similar over a large number 
of nations,"29 or because the ideological conflict over expanding liberaliza­
tion "has never been part of the trade negotiations conducted under the 
GATT."30 
After Seattle and Cancun, one wonders when, if at all, trade negotiations 
were ever ideologically neutral and dependent on "individual national inter­
est."31 The beauty of Behind the Scenes is that it explodes the myth that 
expansion of liberalization is a technocratic process barren of normative and 
contentious and even ideological contests. The myth that trade negotiations 
are technocratic goes back to the days of the old GATT. It was informed by 
the attitude of developed countries and some scholars that issues of devel­
opment were disconnected from the goal of liberalizing trade. Thus, when 
developing countries brought up questions of development within GATT, 
developed countries and scholars sympathetic to the narrow view of GATT 
as an institution committed only to trade liberalization frowned upon such 
efforts as evidence of the extent to which trade negotiations "had become a 
general forum for a debate on international trade policy."32 Such views, so 
skeptical of the utility of issues of development within trade negotiations, 
28. Pp. 3-4, 3 1 -39, 260-63. For an excellent overview of how policy flexibility outside the 
orthodoxy of IMF and World Bank reforms led to exponential export-led growth, see ALICE H. 
AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION 14-18, 76-78 (1989). 
29. WINHAM, supra note 7, at 274-75. 
30. Id. at 275. 
3 1 .  Id. 
32. Id. at 1 37. 
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are eerily similar to present-day critiques of addressing developing-country 
issues in the WTO. 
Unfortunately, some of the critics of negotiating development issues 
within the WTO equate a more democratic and development-sensitive WTO 
with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
("UNCTAD")-a talking shop rather than an effective international trade 
organization, that presumably does the bidding of the most developed mem­
bers even if doing so is inimical to the interests of its developing and least­
developed members.33 Only through political deliberation can trade prob­
lems related to developing and least-developed countries be seen within the 
context of development. For developing and least-developed countries, trade 
problems are not simply a set of technical issues in which predetermined 
choices are applied to separate facts from values and where generalizable 
theories and policies, such as those of comparative advantage and economic 
efficiency, are wholly independent from the particular social context in 
which they are sought to be applied.34 
I will illustrate the foregoing approach to trade and development with an 
example. Although the TRIPs agreement provides for more compliance time 
for least-developed countries, these countries must still come into full com­
pliance with the agreement when it becomes effective for them. The 
extremely strong protections for patents in the TRIPs agreement have been 
identified as barriers to affordable antiretroviral medicines for millions of 
HIV-AIDS infected people, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Advocates 
for flexible interpretations of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in devel­
oping and least-developed countries, which are to be exempt from the TRIPs 
agreement in the field of pharmaceuticals, in particular argue that flexibility 
33. According to such critics, the democratization of the WTO through measures such as 
empowering the Ministerial Conference to engage in genuine negotiations rather than as a forum to 
endorse predetermined decisions would transform the WTO into a debating club like UNCTAD, 
where global trading and commercial rules cannot be hammered out pragmatically without the 
overlay of political cache that the legitimacy crisis has created. This in turn, these critics argue, will 
lead the WTO to abandon issues of importance to the Third World. See Rienhard Rode & David A. 
Deese, WTO Governance-Lost in the Doha Round? (Hallenser IB-Papier 2 /2004, 2004), available 
at http://www.politik.uni-halle.de/rode/texte/IB-PapierGovern0204.PDF. For a view arguing that the 
UNCTAD-ization of the WTO will be bad for trade, see David Hartridge CMG, Speech at the World 
Trade Post-Cancun Conference (Oct. 21, 2004), http://www.sitpro.org.uk/policy/wto/confD3/ 
hartridge.html; see also infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
34. This holistic approach has been the traditional manner in which developing countries 
have approached trade issues even within the old GATT. According to one commentator: 
[D]eveloping countries started from the premise that underdevelopment, even more than indi­
vidual nationhood, was the most profound determinant of their identity. They sought to create 
a status of underdevelopment, and to seek involvement with GATI on what appeared to be 
permanently preferential grounds. They focused on the perpetuating and unchanging aspects of 
their underdevelopment, and they were keenly aware of how economic disadvantages led to 
disadvantages in other aspects of international life. Implicit in the status of underdevelopment 
was their belief that economic benefits were owed them by right rather than by mutual ex­
change, and they approached bargaining in GA TI more as an exercise in collective 
development planning and less as a search for individual quid pro quo. From this perspective, 
the notion that the developing nations should be absolved from expectations of reciprocity in 
GA TI negotiations was a cardinal tenet. 
WINHAM, supra note 7, at 96. 
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is justifiable in light of the HIV-AIDS pandemic that is sweeping across 
many developing and least-developed countries, not to mention malaria and 
tuberculosis, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. According to this view, the 
TRIPs agreement must be seen in light of the fact that more than twenty-five 
million people have died and another twenty-five million are living with the 
HIV-AIDS.35 By contrast, developed countries have rejected interpreting the 
TRIPs agreement in a manner that affects its central commitments to intel­
lectual property protection. The Motta text is an example of the kind of 
empty concession developed countries are willing to give in that it does not 
unsettle or disrupt the protection of pharmaceutical patents even in the face 
of the largest and quickest-spreading public health pandemic in history 
(p. xxxii). 
If the WTO fails to confront and, to the extent possible, resolve the basic 
value conflicts, such as those relating to the protection of patents and access 
to essential medicines, the WTO will continue to remain irrelevant to the 
needs and concerns of developing and least-developed countries. For this 
reason, the WTO's legitimacy crisis will continue until it squarely addresses 
how questions of long-standing and immediate relevance to developing 
countries can be accommodated or become a central part of the trade 
agenda. 
IL A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF Behind 
the Scenes at the WTO 
Having laid down the major themes in Behind the Scenes at the WTO, I 
now proceed to assess its contribution to the debate on reforming the WTO. 
I do so by exploring two issues. First, I will show that while the book dis­
cusses the decisionmaking process at the WTO, it ignores the equally 
untransparent nature of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), al­
though the DSB has contributed to the WTO's legitimacy crisis as much as 
the opaque negotiating process that the book explores.36 Second, I will argue 
that while the book thoroughly explores the downside of the WTO's proce­
dures and methods of negotiating new trade treaties, the framework of the 
book's analysis does not lend itself to tracing the bias against the interests of 
developing countries to problems in the way the liberalizing mandates of the 
WTO are implemented, such as the exclusion of agriculture and commodity 
trade from its liberalization; instead, it traces the bias to the liberalizing 
mandate generally. 
35. I discuss these issues in James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and 
Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End 
Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REv. 727 (2001), and James Thuo Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong 
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 267 (2003). 
See also Obijifor Aginam, From the Core to the Peripheries: Multilateral Governance of Malaria in 
a Mu/ti-Cultural World, 3 CHI. J. INT'L LAW 87 (2000). 
36. The authors acknowledge this problem when they note, "[w]hile it has not been dis­
cussed in detail in this book, the dispute settlement mechanism is an important factor in the power 
of the WTO." P. 292. 
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A. On the Dispute Settlement Body 
The DSB 's role in construing WTO agreements by mobilizing the expert 
knowledge of a group of trade-law specialists substantially contributes to the 
increasingly undemocratic nature of the WTO. Because of the compulsory 
and binding nature of its decisions, the DSB Is the most powerful institution 
among the various bodies of the WTO. By making the DSB so powerful, the 
members of the WTO effectively channeled the organization's most contro­
versial issues away from guidance through democratic deliberation. In other 
words, a cadre of experts with "technical knowledge" about the text of WTO 
law have b�come the most important factor in decisions that would other­
wise be entrusted to the political representatives of WTO member states. In 
addition, the DSB hears cases in secret, away from public view, and the cri­
teria for the selection of its panelists are unclear. The inadequacy of 
administrative procedures and safeguards to ensure the accountability of the 
DSB is objectionable.37 
These objections to the absence of clear procedural rules or their en­
forcement are strengthened by the fact that the otherwise laudable 
institutional design of having a powerful WTO judiciary may be said to re­
flect a choice against empowering the WTO's decisionmaking process 
through deliberation and broad-based bargaining among WTO members. A 
powerful WTd judiciary arguably exists at the expense of an equally power­
ful WTO legislative body that would be regarded as more representative and 
legitimate. Since the DSB is not the subject of Behind the Scenes at the 
WTO, we do not learn in the book how the WTO shields controversial issues 
from a political process of deliberation by entrusting decisionmaking to an 
opaque and powerful judiciary. 
The DSB favors the interests of its most powerful members through its 
interpretive role. It does so by applying or interpreting rules of the interna­
tional trading regime in favor of developed countries while foreclosing 
equally plausible applications and interpretations that are favorable to de-
37. See Susan Esserrnan & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2003, 
at 130, 1 38. Esserrnan and Howse note that the secrecy of the WTO's dispute settlement submis­
sions and hearings is "an unacceptable vestige of the old days of cloak-and-dagger diplomacy." Id. 
The Global Administrative Law Project at New York University Law School has noted the system­
atic absence of such safeguards in a variety of multilateral institutions that have regulatory impact 
within countries. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law (Int') 
Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2004/l ,  2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=692628. The absence of safeguards to ensure the accountability of the DSB 
or mechanism for their enforcement is reflected by the fact that in at least one case, a panelist in a 
DSB case had a conflict of interest. In the Tuna-Dolphin II case, panelist Alan Oxley was found to 
have represented the Brock Group, which, according to the company's brochure, lobbied on behalf 
of the Mexican government for NAFfA. Mexico had a direct interest in the outcome of the case as it 
was the initiator of the Tuna-Dolphin I case that Tuna Dolphin II sought to enforce. See Lori Wal­
lach, Testimony of Lori Wallach Regarding U. S. Preparation for the World Trade Organi?,ation 's 
1999 Ministerial Meeting, Pua. CITIZEN, May 14, 1999,  http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/Qatar/ 
seattle_mini/articles.cfm?ID=5468. 
In September 2005, the WTO for the first time opened up panel proceedings of the dispute set­
tlement body to the public. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Opens Panel Proceeding 
to Public for the First Time (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/ 
news05 _elopenpanel_l 2sep_e.htm. 
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veloping countries and are entirely consistent with the rules of the interna­
tional trading regime. Thus in two different cases raising exactly the same 
question under Article 1 5  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,38 which was 
consciously designed to benefit developing countries, the DSB reached two 
different interpretations: one favoring developing countries and the other 
favoring developed countries. 39 
Article 1 5  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for "constructive 
remedies" as an alternative to the imposition of anti-dumping duties.40 This 
"special regard" remedy is applicable where "the essential interests of de­
veloping country Members" would be affected.41 In the Doha negotiations, 
developing countries have therefore argued that before a developed country 
applies an anti-dumping measure that would adversely affect the essential 
interests of a developing country, constructive remedies should be ex­
plored.42 This was India's argument in the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Measures on Steel Plate from India Case ("Steel Plate Case"). India argued 
that the United States had violated "the first sentence of Article 1 5  of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, which states in relevant part that ' [i]t is recog­
nized that special regard must be given by developed country Members,' by 
failing to give special regard to India's status as a developing country when 
considering the application of anti-dumping duties."43 According to India, 
the mandatory first sentence in Article 1 5  imposed an obligation, the pa­
rameters of which would be determined based on the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case.44 
The Appellate Body of the DSB held that the first sentence of Article 1 5  
did not impose any "specific or general obligation on Members to undertake 
any particular action.'"'5 This departs from a tradition under which Article 
17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement allows a member state to construe 
favorably provisions such as Article 1 5  that are broad and general and are 
capable of admitting different possible interpretations if the member state 
38. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATI, Apr. 15, 1994, in THE RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGaTIATIONS, supra note 26, at 168 [hereinafter 
Anti-Dumping Agreement]. The purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "is to counteract the 
effects of price discrimination in sales by a foreign producer which results in injury to the industry 
of the importing country." James Thuo Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy Through International 
Legal Minimalism: A Re-Characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L 
EcoN. L. l ,  53 (2004 ). 
39 . I draw this example from an earlier paper. See James Gathii, Fairness as Fidelity to Mak­
ing the WTO F ully Responsive to All Its Members, 96 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 157 (2003). 
40. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 38. 
41. Id. 
42. See generally Victor Mosoti, In Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as an Antidote to 
the Remedial Deficiences in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process; A View from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 231 (2001). 
43. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 38, at art. 15 ; see Panel Report, United States­
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate From India, 'JI 7.104, WT/DS206/R 
(June 28, 2002) [hereinafter Steel Plate Case]. 
44. Steel Plate Case, supra note 43, 'JI 7.110. 
45. Id. 
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acted in accordance with "one of those permissible interpretations."46 The 
AB ' s interpretation is consistent with an approach that conceptualizes 
claims made by developing countries in the international economic realm of 
trade, investment, and finance as occupying no more than a vague, nonlegal, 
and at times political status.47 By contrast, this conceptualization ineluctably 
favors claims couched in the protective garb of WTO law, which develop­
ing-country members are less likely to have the expertise and experience to 
d 48 0. 
It is important to observe here that it was open to the AB to, for exam­
ple, consider Article 1.5 as requiring no more than a balanced trading 
framework given the propensity of developing-country anti-dumping law to 
target developing countries, which are unable to retaliate against those 
"most capable of dumping their exports',49 on them. In fact, in the Anti­
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India Case 
("Bed Linen Case"),50 the European Union agreed with India's view that the 
second sentence of Article 1 5  imposed a legal obligation on developed­
country members to explore the possibilities of constructive remedies before 
applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the e:;sential interests 
of developing-country members.51 Although the AB concluded that the sec­
ond sentence of Article 15 does not predetermine any particular outcome, it 
nevertheless observed that the " 'exploration' of possibilities must be ac­
tively undertaken by the developed country authorities with a willingness to 
reach a positive outcome."52 . 
In addition, in the Steel Plate Case, the AB held that simply because the 
Indian company was operating in a developing country "does not mean that 
it somehow shares the 'special situation' of the developing country Mem­
ber."53 This holding raises a rhetorical question: what would it take to have 
Article 1 5  construed in favor of a developing country? It is important to note 
here that in the Steel Plate Case, U.S. Department of Commerce officials 
had orally informed Indian officials that the U.S. steel industry and Con­
gress would oppose an agreement under Article 15.54 Although the AB 
46. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 38, art. 17 .6( ii). 
4 7. The characterization of the issue of access to essential medicines as a nontrade or a po­
litical issue that cannot be accommodated within the TRIPs agreement is another example of such a 
disempowering characterization that disproportionately affects developing-country populations 
adversely. 
48. See infra note 59 and accompanying text; see also James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status 
of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 291, 315 (2002). 
49. Alexander Roitinger, Antidumping Refonn, Trade Policy Flexibility, and Compensation 
( Univ. Saint Gallen, Discussion Paper No. 2002-1 8,. 2002). 
50. Panel Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on lmpons of Cotton-Type 
Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000). 
51. Id. 'l[ 6.221. 
52 . Id. 'l[ 6.233 ( emphasis added). 
53. Steel P late Case, supra note 43, 'l[ 7.111. 
54. Id. 'l[ 7.105. 
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agreed that the United States did entertain the proposal and that it therefore 
was in compliance with Article 1 5 ,  the effect of the decision was to read out 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement the apparent effect of Article 15 for devel­
oping countries. 
It is not surprising therefore that the United States favors price undertak­
ings55 as an alternative to anti-dumping measures under Article 1 5  and, as it 
argued in the Steel Plate Case, it does not believe Article 1 5  of the Anti­
Dumping Agreement imposes "any specific legal obligations on developed 
country Members."56 Price undertakings are allowed as a substitute to anti­
dumping measures under Article 8, which provides: 
Proceedings may be suspended or terminated without imposition of provi­
sional measures or anti-dumping duties upon receipt of satisfactory 
voluntary undertakings from any exporter to revise its prices or to cease its 
exports to the area in question at dumped prices that the authorities are sat­
isfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated.57 
These opposing interpretations of Article 15 demonstrate that there is 
more at stake than simply making anti-dumping investigations more trans­
parent. There are choices that have to be made between alternative proposals 
regarding the implementation of anti-dumping measures, especially against 
developing countries. Indeed, a group of developing countries has raised the 
need to clarify various provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, includ­
ing the specific meaning of "ordinary course of trade," "constructed value," 
and "the lesser duty rule." Developing countries have also sought a formal 
ban on the practice of zeroing, which two AB decisions have struck down.58 
A call for outlawing a practice already found to be inconsistent with the 
agreement indicates the level of legal insecurity that developing countries 
experience at the WTO. Some developing-country members have also pro­
posed reducing the application of anti-dumping measures against developing 
55. Price undertakings are import price minima or thresholds. See Michael 0. Moore, VERs 
and Price Undertakings Under the WTO, 13 REv. INT'L EcoN. 298 (2005). 
56. Steel Plate Case, supra note 43, 'l[ 7. !06. 
57. Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 38, at art. 8. 
58. Position papers were presented prior to Doha by South Africa, Colombia, Korea, Guate­
mala, India, and Romania. See Communication from South Africa, South African Development 
Community Ministers' Agreed Negotiating Objectives for the Third WTO Ministerial Conference, 
WT/U317 (Oct. l, 1999); Communication from Colombia, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial 
Conference, WT/GC/W/315 (Sept. 14, 1999); Communication from Korea-Revision, Preparations 
for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, WT/GC/W/235/Rev.l (Oct. 11,  1999); Communication from 
Guatemala, P reparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, WTIGCIW/330 (Sept. 23, 1999); 
Communication from India, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, WT/GC/W /200 
(June 14, 1999); Communication from Romania, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, 
WT/GC/W/319 (Sept. 15, 1999). 
Since Doha, communications from Canada and India have raised similar concerns. See 
Communication from Canada, Improved Disciplines Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun­
tervailing Measures and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, TN/RUW/ l ( Apr. 15, 2002 ); Submission by 
India, Proposals on Implementation Related Issues and Concerns, TN/RUW/4 ( Apr. 25, 2002); see 
also Paper from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mex­
ico, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, Anti-Dumping: lllustrative Major 
issues, TN/RUW/6 ( Apr. 26, 2002). 
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countries.59 Japan and Chile have proposed even further-reaching changes 
that would limit the application of anti-dumping measures to predatory pric-
• • 60 mg practices. 
Given the growing importance of anti-dumping, especially among de­
veloping countries,61 and its continuing role to soothe domestic industries in 
industrial economies such as the United States that suffer at the hands of 
international competition, 62 compromise will not be easily realized. In par­
ticular, the U.S.  Congress has now given the nonnefotiability of trade 
remedy laws legislative blessing in the 2002 Trade Act.6 A bargaining posi­
tion that precludes renegotiation of the anti-dumping regime gives the DSB 
enormous authority since its interpretations are the only avenue by which 
developing countries can hope to check the abuses of developed countries. 
Yet, as the foregoing decisions show, the DSB cannot be trusted to consis­
tently check developed countries' abuses of anti-dumping, even when the 
rules allow for checking such abuses. Crucially, developing countries have 
not been able to shape the emerging DSB jurisprudence to favor their inter­
ests in the way that developed countries have been able to do because they 
lack the legal expertise necessary to challenge a developed country at the 
DSB , not to mention the resources to support the prohibitive cost of such 
• 64 services. 
Because of the opaqueness of its decisionmaking process and the sus­
ceptibility of its rules to be construed in favor of some countries and against 
others despite the availability of alternative interpretations, the DSB is not 
59. Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda, Preparations for the 1999 Ministe­
rial Conference, WT/GC/W/354 (Oct. 1 1 , 1999). 
60. Communication from Japan, P reparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Proposal 
on Anti-Dumping Measures, WT/GC/W/240 (July 6, 1999); Communication from Chile, P repara­
tions for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Proposal on Anti-Dumping Measures, WT/GC/W/366 
(Oct. 12, 1999). 
6 1 .  New Antidumping lnvestigations Decline But More Measures lmposed, WTO Repons, 19 
INT'L TRADE REP. 1 860. Although there were eighty-two fewer anti-dumping investigations started 
in the second half of 2002 compared with the first half of 2002, developing countries are using the 
anti-dumping regime even more. For example, India retained its premier position in initiating new 
anti-dumping investigations while countries such as Argentina, Egypt, Mexico, and Thailand had 
become popular users. 
62. Sharyn O'Halloran argues: 
[I]nterest group influence has already been incorporated into the regulatory process through 
the procedures that govern administrative decision making. That is, the standards by which in­
dustries qualify for government assistance, whether it be anti-dumping actions or trade 
adjustment assistance, are themselves the result of the political process. Thus interest group in­
fluence may be apparent not at regulatory proceedings, but rather in the standards of proof 
applied at these proceedings. 
SHARYN O'HALLORAN, POLITICS, PROCESS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 1 8 1  ( 1 994). 
63. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(l4), 1 16 Stat. 933, 1001 (2002). 
64. Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing 
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in INT'L CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM IN THE WTO 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.icstd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_papers/DSU_2003.pdf. 
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an appropriate forum to decide the broad range of questions confronting the 
WTO. 
B .  Market Failure and Asymmetrical Application of Market Nonns 
My second major critique focuses on the nonrecognition of market fail­
ure and the asymmetrical application of market norms in Behind the Scenes 
at the WTO. The book traces bias against developing countries predomi­
nantly to the methods of negotiating trade agreements among countries65 and 
to the WTO's "free trade ideology," which the authors recommend should be 
reconsidered and "thrown out" (p. lxxi). The book understates the fact that 
bias against developing countries is not simply the inevitable outcome of 
free-market ideologies, but that it is also due to the manner in which market 
norms have or have not been mobilized.66 For more than fifty years, global 
trade negotiations reduced tariffs on the manufacturing and industrial sec­
tors in which developed economies led the world, while areas such as 
agriculture, textiles, and clothing-where low-cost developing countries 
have the comparative advantage-were heavily protected and subsidized by 
rich industrialized countries. For example, the United States and the Euro­
pean Union each give more than one billion dollars in agricultural subsidies 
annually, undermining the comparative advantage that developing countries 
enjoy in agricultural trade.67 
This reluctance to extend market principles to areas in which developing 
countries had a comparative advantage is not the inexorable outcome of the 
application of free-market principles, but rather is due to their selective ap­
plication. The free-trade mandate of the WTO does not apply equally to 
industrial and agricultural products. Behind the Scenes at the WTO over­
states the effect of relations of domination and dependence (p. 305). While 
this dynamic certainly exists, as evidenced by the reasons given for Nige-
,}ia' s and the Philippines' recent threats to pull out of the WT0,68 the book 
understates the extent to which biased applications of market norms are an 
essential aspect of the legitimacy crisis at the WTO. 
Although the United States and countries in the European Union are not 
the lowest-cost producers of cotton, they have continued to be effectively 
insulated from having a legal obligation not to subsidize their own high-cost 
producers of cotton. U.S. and E.U. cotton farmers receive billions of dollars 
in subsidies, at the expense of much lower-cost producers in developing 
countries. Despite victories against cotton and sugar subsidies in the DSB 
65. See supra Part I. 
66. For an excellent analysis of how market nonns do not have a fixed natural and necessary 
meaning but are rather contingent, see Joel M. Ngugi, Re-Examining the Role of Private Property in 
Market Democracies: Problematic Ideological Issues Raised By Land Registration, 25 MICH. J. 
INT'L L. 467, 468-75 (2004). 
67. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME ET AL., supra note 26, at 123. 
68. Pp. 177, 1 83 .  These threats arise from these countries' sense that the global trading re­
gime is rigged against them. 
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recently,69 developing countries cannot vigorously enforce anti-subsidy rules 
in the same way that the United States and the European Union can. Devel­
oping countries simply lack the market power that developed countries have 
by virtue of their lion's share of global trade. Since developing countries 
rely on the openness of developed-country markets to generate foreign ex­
change, they do not have the market power to sanction or even threaten 
developed countries that use their power to manipulate the rules of the trad­
ing framework. B y  contrast, the mere threat of sanctions by a developed 
country against a developing country often creates the result desired by the 70 developed country. 
The United States' market power enables it to continue heavily subsidiz­
ing its farmers, yet only three percent of the U.S . population is engaged in 
agriculture compared to over seventy percent of the population engaged in 
agriculture in developing countries. The cotton subsidies in the United 
States and the European Union have, in effect, pushed the livelihoods of 
over ten million otherwise lowest-cost cotton farmers in Central and West 
Africa to the poverty line, if not below it. Subsidies also make it impossible 
for poor countries to get their share of global trade.71 
Cotton subsidies are simply the tip of the iceberg. The GATT-WTO 
treaty framework is full of examples of a basic lack of fidelity to making the 
basic rules of the global trading framework apply equally to all products. 
This has been a major reason for the current deadlock in WTO negotiations. 
For example, the 1948 GATT and the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture have 
legalized exceptions to market access and the nondiscrimination norms of 
the trading framework.72 Article XI:2(c)(i) of the 1948 GATT exempted 
quantitative restrictions in agriculture from the GATT's nondiscrimination 
mandates. In 1955, the GATT waived the preconditions of discriminating 
against imported products under Article XI:2(c)(i), giving the United States 
a free hand to restrict agricultural imports. GATT Article XVI:3 authorized 
agricultural subsidies although no such subsidies were allowed for industrial. 
goods.73 These exceptions introduced double standards for developed and 
developing countries by allowing agriculture to be treated outside the non­
discrimination disciplines of the GATT framework. The 1994 Agreement on 
Agriculture, while an improvement over the 1948 GATT, also introduced its 
own legalized exceptions exempting agriculture from full liberalization. 
In addition to these legalized exceptions, markets are imperfect because 
they are subject to problems such as externalities, information asymmetries, 
69. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Expon Subsidies on Sugar, WT/ 
DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005); Appellate Body Report, United 
States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005). 
70. Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Ap-
proach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1 30 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005). 
7 1 .  WORLD BANK, GLOBAL EcONOMIC PROSPECTS: REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROMISE 
OF THE DOHA AGENDA 107--08 (2003), available at http://sitesources.worldbank.org/ 
INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext.pdf. 
72. Gathii, supra note 1 2, at 91 1 n. 129. 
73. Id. 
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and other types of market failure. Markets are therefore susceptible to ma­
nipulation, with the result that outcomes at odds with the virtues associated 
with free markets are commonplace. For example, the WTO's trade liberali­
zation mandates often work at cross purposes with the World Bank's poverty 
reduction programs implemented by poor countries.74 Another type of mar­
ket failure is evidenced by the fact that the costs of implementing Uruguay 
Round commitments such as the TRIPs agreement have been so costly that 
they have undermined any potential benefits they may confer on developing 
and least-developed countries. This is not to mention that the TRIPs agree­
ment results in wealth transfer on the order of $5.8 billion annually from 
developing countries to the United States.75 
These examples demonstrate that the WTO is caught on a seismic fault 
line. On the one side are its most powerful members, bent on ensuring that 
the global trading agenda continues to create new and profitable opportuni­
ties for their citizens while preserving old opportunities. On the other side of 
the fault line are developing and least-developed countries and their direct 
and urgent demands to have the trading regime address questions of poverty 
and social division, especially by removing distortions in global agricultural 
trade. The rich countries seek to protect current WTO privileges while ex­
tending obligations into new areas where they have a comparative 
advantage. For developing countries, by contrast, negotiations should focus 
on lightening existing obligations while paying more attention to issues of 
development. These conflicting goals of the rich and poor members of the 
WTO have generated fierce discussions and stalled negotiations in the Doha 
Round. Unsurprisingly, the tensions produced by these conflicting visions of 
the future of the WTO led to the collapses of the 1999 ministerial confer­
ence in Seattle and the 2004 ministerial conference in Cancun. 
A basic problem with how the WTO has addressed the concerns of de­
veloping and least-developed countries is that it has sought to interpret their 
demands for reform in ways that do not disturb the rigged rules of global 
agricultural trade. The WTO has failed to squarely address the possibility 
that the continuation of distorted and unfair global agricultural trade rules 
informs the disenchantment of developing and least-developed countries 
with the global trading system. Instead, the WTO has sought to simply ad­
just its trade liberalization agenda at the margins to accommodate 
developing and least-developed countries. Ultimately, a major task in WTO 
reform is to determine how to encourage its members, especially the rich­
est countries and their citizens, to act beyond the immediacy of their local 
needs and regard the needs of others-even if they live across national 
74. J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: 
The Development Challenge 1 ,  1 (World Bank, Working Paper No. WPS 2215, 1999), available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/941 .pdf. 
75. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Issues for the New Round, in THE WTO AFTER 
SEATTLE 1 37, 142 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000). 
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boundaries-with some empathy and compassion.76 Only then would it be 
possible to ensure that market norms applied to all products and produce, 
irrespective of their origin. 
CONCLUSION 
If the WTO is really a member-driven organization in which decisions 
are made by consensus, as it claims to be, then it ought to open itself up to 
competing ideas and viewpoints about its role, particularly with reference to 
issues of concern to developing and least-developed countries. As Jawara 
and Kwa have shown, the WTO Secretariat in particular cannot be trusted to 
be an "honest broker," listening to the diverse views of the WTO member­
ship (pp. 22 1, 228). By usurping the role of overseeing negotiations 
inconsistently with the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO members end up 
negotiating with the Secretariat rather than with each other (pp. 63-64, 224-
28, 255-56, 259). The Secretariat has demonstrated itself to be incapable of 
facilitating the open debate that would ensure that all views are represented 
and taken into account in arriving at new agreements, resolving outstanding 
implementation issues raised by members, or addressing such other issues 
as genuine liberalization of global agricultural trade (pp. xli-xliii). 
To correct these shortcomings, all the members of the WTO must come 
up with a democratic decisionmaking framework within which there are 
clear criteria for inclusive decisionrnaking. These criteria would replace the 
current consensus model adopted by the WTO, which Jawara and Kwa have 
demonstrated is both a charade and a convenient mask for pushing through 
the agenda of the most powerful members of the WTO. It would also mean 
abandoning the criticisms that have been leveled against debating the 
agenda of the WTO as recommended by developing and least-developed 
countries. Such criticisms are exemplified by the remarks of the then USTR, 
Robert Zoellick, after the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial. Zoellick ar­
gued that the rhetoric of "won't do" countries overwhelmed the willingness 
of "can do" countries to work out a compromise at Cancun.77 I agree with 
Richard Steinberg when he dismisses such claims78 precisely because they 
seek to undermine the very things that could rebuild trust within the trading 
framework amongst all its members. 
How can the WTO rebuild trust? After the collapse of the 1999 ministe­
rial in Seattle, the WTO adopted nonbinding guidelines on how to proceed 
with negotiations, but these guidelines were not followed at the Doha Minis­
terial and certainly not at the Cancun Ministerial (pp. 278-79). Developing 
76. See RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003); James Gathii, 
International Justice and the Trading Regime, EMORY INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming 2005). 
77. Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-Do Countries, FIN. TIMES (Lon­
don), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23; see also RODE & DEESE, supra note 33; WTO Chair Suggests 
Developing Countries Overplayed Hand on Cotton Issue, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. 1 889, 1 889 (Nov. 
13 ,  2003). 
78. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, 
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. I. INT'L L. 247 (2004). 
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countries proposed that the Trade Negotiations Committee ("TNC") that 
was set up at the Doha Ministerial conference in 2001 to oversee the Doha 
negotiating mandate should oversee the Doha negotiations rather than the 
Secretariat.79 Under the Doha mandate, the TNC supervises negotiations 
"under the authority of the General Council."80 Developing countries have 
argued that it is the prerogative of the members, through the TNC, rather 
than the General Council and the Secretariat, to oversee negotiations (pp. 
227-28). According to these countries, Article VI:4 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement81 precludes the staff of the Secretariat from being involved in the 
negotiating process and, in particular, from directing the process by having 
the Chair of the General Council simultaneously serving as the Chair of the 
TNC. This position is also informed in part by a desire not to repeat the ex­
perience of the Uruguay Round, at which the members of the WTO 
ended up negotiating with the Secretariat rather than amongst themselves 
(pp. 221, 228). 
These countries, therefore, proposed putting in place clear and binding 
rules to govern the negotiating process not only before the TNC, but also in 
the conduct of the business of the various councils established under a vari­
ety of treaties and plurilateral agreements, as well as all committees, working 
parties, groups, and monitoring bodies that comprise the entire WTO machin­
ery. With regard to the TNC, the following rules would apply under this 
proposal: the roles of the TNC and the General Council would be separated; 
all negotiations would take place in formal sessions without concurrent 
informal meetings; selection of the chair of the TNC and all negotiating 
groups would be by consensus and would be made from the membership of 
the General Council; minutes of all meetings would be kept and made avail­
able within ten days of the meeting; all drafting of texts would be done in 
open meetings with all language in disagreement appearing in brackets; and 
finally, negotiating texts would be made available to member delegations in 
the three official languages of the WTO two weeks in advance, to enable 
them to study them and consult with their capitals for instructions.82 
79. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 ,  '[ 46, 
WT/MIN(Ol )/DEC/l, 4 1  l.L.M. 746 (2002) ("The overall conduct of the negotiations shall be su­
pervised by a Trade Negotiations Committee under the authority of the General Council. The Trade 
Negotiations Committee shall hold its first meeting not later than 31 January 2002. It shall establish 
appropriate negotiating mechanisms as required and supervise the progress of the negotiations."). 
80. Id. 
8 1 .  Article VI:4 o f  the Marrakesh Agreement provides in part that "the staff o f  the Secre­
tariat shall be exclusively international in character." Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 38, art. 
VI, '[ 4. This provision somewhat coincides with article V(5)(c) of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), which provides that the 
"President, officers and staff of the Bank, in the discharge of their offices, owe their duty entirely to 
the Bank and to no authority." Int'! Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Articles of Agreement, 
art. V, '[ 5(c) (Feb. 1 6, 1989), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/ 
Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf. "Each member of the bank shall respect the international 
character of this duty and shall refrain from all attempts to influence any of them in the discharge of 
their duties." Id. (emphasis added). 
82. See pp. 2 1 9-24; Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Pakistan, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, Establishment of the Trade Negotiations Committee and 
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Reforms such as these, aimed at improving transparency, accountability, and 
openness, are critical to restoring trust among the members of the WTO. 
Unfortunately, developed countries prefer fewer and vaguer guidelines, to 
give them maximum leverage in negotiations.83 
Making clear rules for the participation of nonstate actors within the 
WTO's decisionmaking process is important. Facilitating the participation 
of nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") based in developing countries 
and representing the interests of those most adversely affected by trade is 
particularly crucial.84 Such participatory rules ought to be made without ro­
manticized conceptions that overstate the importance of NGOs in creating 
accountability and transparency at the WT0.85 While NGOs are often por­
trayed as grassroots alternatives or antidotes to a state-centric and market­
oriented trading framework that is insensitive to the concerns of the poor 
and those displaced by trade, this is not always true of all NGOs. First, not 
all NGOs incorporate a pro-poor agenda. They may represent the conflicting 
interests of different "losers" in global trade. For example, the NGOs that 
represent the interests of agriculture in the United States or in Europe have 
different agendas than those that represent the displaced cotton farmers of 
Central and West Africa. 86 Focusing on the common loss due to free trade 
may underplay national, gender, class, and other differences.87 
Inclusion of NGOs as part of WTO reform must be done cautiously, 
guarding against the possibility that increased participation by nonstate ac­
tors will simply intensify the struggle over which set of forces will 
constitute a reformed WTO. Most importantly, reforms aimed at greater 
Related Issues WT/GC/58 (Dec. 2 1 ,  2001 ), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/ 
library.cfm?reflD=25737. 
83. P. 278. An important recent report argues that "[w]e do not believe a set of inflexible 
rules for the conduct and preparation of Ministerial conferences is the answer." SUTHERLAND ET 
AL., supra note 17, at 7 1 .  The report also endorses a continuation of green-room meetings to which 
only a few countries are invited. Id. at 72-73. 
84. As Daniel C. Esty argues, NGOs are the connective tissue between the WTO and civil 
society. Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Coop­
eration, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT' L EcoN. L. 123 ( 1 998). 
85. Local and transnational networks and alliances are not necessarily pro-poor. See Gillian 
Hart, Paper for the Conference on Creative Destruction at CUNY Graduate Center: Denaturalizing 
Dispossession: Critical Ethnography in the Age of Resurgent Imperialism (Apr. 1 5-17,  2004), 
available at http://geography.berkeley.edu/PeopleHistory/faculty/GHart_CreativeDestruction.pdf. 
86. Thus according to Raustiala: 
[N]ot all states benefit, nor in the aggregate can NGO participation be considered an unmiti­
gated good. Lobbyists in the U.S. Congress, for instance, provide many of same services to 
legislators-information, political cover, monitoring of deals, and so forth . . . . Yet few ap­
plaud the role of lobbyists in American politics . . . .  Civil society is not inherently "good" and 
state power "bad." Enhanced participation by civil society in governance may enhance the 
power of self-interested groups that are already powerful-in resources, organization, political 
influence-and this may undermine the political processes and lead to a low level of regime 
effectiveness. 
Kai Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT'L STUD. Q. 7 19, 
726 ( 1 997). 
87. For a similar critique, see Giles Mohan & Kristian Stokke, Participatory Development 
and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 247, 264 (2000). 
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transparency must go hand in hand with a commitment in principle as well 
as in praxis to address issues of development and the liberalization of agri­
culture. Such reforms will go furthest in resolving the present crisis at the 
WTO. As a strategy, developing countries must emphasize the procedural 
aspects of the reform agenda, since they will shape and form the discursive 
terrain within which the inextricably linked issues of agricultural trade re­
form and inclusion of development issues will play out.88 
Strengthening the WTO's negotiating framework and the DSB by com­
mitting to reforms aimed at greater transparency and inclusiveness will 
restart multilateral negotiations-as developed countries wish to do-and 
would strengthen the WTO by giving developing countries a space within 
which to collectively negotiate with developed countries. Thus, reforms 
aimed at rebuilding trust will benefit both developing and developed coun­
tries. Such reforms would also refocus attention away from forum-shifting 
into bilateral and regional trade treaties, in which individual countries bar­
gaining with the United States may not have much leverage.89 
Behind the Scenes at the WTO proceeds from the premise that bias 
against developing-country interests at the WTO is necessarily the discerni­
ble and determinate outcome of the WTO's market-based trade 
liberalization model as well as its undemocratic decisionmaking methods. In 
this Review, I have shown that by tracing bias against developing countries 
as such, Jawara and K wa overemphasize the origin of the bias in the public 
realm of intersovereign relations among the WTO's member states. In so 
doing, they understate how the private-law norms of free trade, including the 
market, are deployed in a manner that benefits the interests of the WTO's 
richest members at the expense of its poorest members. Thus, while I agree 
88.  As Gillian Hart argues: 
Discourses and processes of globalization are inextricably linked-indeed dialectically­
connected with one another, and deeply infused with the exercise of power. Precisely because the 
categories and discursive strategies that we use to describe processes have real effects-<lefining 
and delimiting terrains of practical action and the formation of political identities-discourses of 
globalization actively shape the very processes they purport to describe. The discursive power of 
globalization is most clearly evident in practices of meaning-making that portray neoliberal forms 
of capitalism as natural, inevitable, and beyond question. 
GILLIAN HART, DISABLING GLOBALIZATION: PLACES OF POWER IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
293 (2002). 
89 .  WTO mini-ministerials also fall in this category of forum shifting. See pp. !xiii, 59--62. 
Former USTR Robert Zoellick has justified regional/bilateral agreements for exactly the opposite 
reasons. After the conclusion of such an agreement with the Dominican Republic he commented: 
It is my firm belief that if we enter into an agreement in which the developing countries feel 
that they have actually negotiated the agreement as opposed to having had an agreement thrust 
upon them, that it will be both more stable, more satisfactory, and it will provide a platform for 
real positive growth, an economic partnership over the coming years. 
Emmy B. Simmons, Conference: Linking Trade and Sustainable Development: Keynote Address, 1 8 
AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1 27 1 ,  1 30 1 ;  see also WORLD TRADE 0RG., A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DIS­
PUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 109 (2004) (arguing that bilateral trade agreements give developing 
countries more bargaining viz a viz developed countries like the United States because the WTO's 
dispute settlement system is intricate and its substantive law difficult for developing countries to 
master with a view to bringing a complaint). But see Shaffer, supra note 70 (arguing that such forum 
shifting leads to the isolation of dissenting countries until they relent). 
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with Jawara and Kwa that the decisionmaking processes of the WTO must 
become more inclusive, transparent, and participatory, I also maintain that 
expanding the WTO's stated organizational mandate of free trade to agricul­
ture and other areas in which developing countries have a comparative 
advantage ought to be an integral part of the reform agenda at the WTO. By 
paying attention to the differential application of free-trade norms as be­
tween developed and developing countries within the WTO, both in the 
enactment of new rules and in the application of existing ones by the dispute 
settlement body and by developed country members, I have sought to give a 
more complete picture of the high stakes of the WTO reform. At the end of 
the day, extending liberalization to agriculture and limiting the expansion of 
the trading regime only into areas in which developed countries have a 
comparative advantage, among other challenges facing developing countries 
in the trading regime, are challenges inextricably linked to reforming the 
undemocratic and untransparent decisionmaking process at the WTO. 
